Monitoring of attacks on Journalists in Brazil 2023 report
The Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (Abraji) is a non-profit organization founded in 2002 by professional journalists interested in improving the quality of Brazilian journalism. The association’s pillars are promoting the professional training of journalists and defending freedom of the press and the right to access public information. Its primary activities involve organizing face-to-face and online courses; hosting the International Congress of Investigative Journalism; producing content through news and guides for the exercise of the profession; and fostering projects that contribute to the exercise of journalism and monitor the situation of freedom of expression and press in the country, combined with legal protection, litigation, and advocacy actions to promote the defense of these rights. For more information, visit https://abraji.org.br/.

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ABRAJI PADF VOCES DEL SUR
Executive Summary

The Monitoring of Attacks on Journalists is a project of the Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (Abraji) that collects and presents data and analyzes press freedom in Brazil. It aims to help elucidate the situation of violence against journalists, communicators, the media, and the press in the country, leading to public debate and the attention of the authorities to the trends, problems, and possible solutions to this scenario. This is the third annual edition of the report—the fourth publication disclosing project data—and it gathers the results of the systematic work done throughout 2023 by the Abraji team.

For the first time in the last four years—since monitoring has adopted an accurate and replicable methodology—the number of attacks has fallen from 557 attacks recorded in 2022 to 330 in 2023—a 40.7% drop. With the end of the term of office of former President Jair Bolsonaro (PL), the political scenario has changed, which has been reflected in the overall situation of the press in the country. After a period of strategic campaigns to discredit journalists and journalism, the siege of media professionals has slowed down a little. However, this does not mean that we have reached a comfortable situation. The year also presented severe obstacles for those who work with journalism in Brazil, starting with intense attacks on democracy in the invasion of the headquarters of the three branches of government in Brasília (DF), going through a consecutive increase in severe assaults on journalists—including physical violence and threats—and ending with a proportional and absolute growth in civil and criminal proceedings against communicators. Even though the figures have
declined, there is still a long time to fight against abolishing the freedom to exercise journalism in Brazil. Abraji has monitored violations against the press independently since 2013. In 2019, it became part of the Voces del Sur Network (VDS), currently comprising 17 Latin American and Caribbean countries. In a joint effort and with a shared methodology, network members follow the progress of their countries toward the 16.10.1 Sustainable Development Goal of the UN Agenda 2030. Before 2022, data on Brazil were published exclusively in the Shadow Report, the annual publication of VdS. Since then, Abraji has also disclosed its data and analyses in its reports, seeking to contribute to the debate on the safety of journalists in the country and Latin America.

Currently, 13 indicators of types of aggression are the basis of monitoring and can occur independently or jointly. This and other standard variables characterize the alerts of violence against the press and allow comparisons between the VdS member countries. The project also gathers information about victims, their work, place of action, gender and age, and data about the perpetrators, such as name, gender, and classification based on their occupation. In addition, there is a cross-sectional analysis of gender violence and online attacks.

Maintaining a gloomy tradition established in other years of monitoring, Stigmatizing Discourses remains the main form of attack on journalists and journalism. The

1 Reduce the number of verified cases of murder, kidnapping, forced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture of journalists, media personnel, trade unionists and human rights defenders over the past 12 months.

2 Due to differences in methodology adopted by the various organizations that monitor violations of press freedom in Brazil, these numbers may vary from one survey to another.
category represents 47.2% of the cases of 2023. It is connected to strategies of disbelief of the press, which have been initiated, incited, and propagated by political actors in recent years, mainly in digital environments. Indeed, 55.7% of the alerts had state agents as perpetrators, and 52.1% had their origin or repercussion on the Internet.

Other trends have strengthened in the last analyzed period, such as increased civil or criminal judicial cases to silence journalists, reaching 7.9% of the total aggressions, and the growth of serious aggressions registered in the Aggressions and Attacks category, reaching 38.2%.

Gender violence against journalists remains worrying, although the total number has fallen to 82 episodes throughout the year. The severe physical assaults against trans women journalists are an attention point, indicating that diversity and increased representativeness in journalism must be accompanied by policies to combat LGBTphobia inside and outside newsrooms.

Given these results, we recommend that:

- **State agents** must not violate press freedom, either by preventing access to information or by adopting a speech against the work of journalists.
- **Government branches** must reinforce policies to protect journalists and communicators who are victims of attacks due to the exercise of the profession, considering the new forms of attack and past trends.
- **Social media platforms** must develop parameters and tools to address online violence affecting journalists, considering their position in the public debate and their role in revealing facts of public interest.
• **Newsrooms and journalistic companies** must adopt training, prevention, and protection measures for their professionals, considering the profession’s risks, whether they are hired or freelancers, reporters, or other workers involved in producing journalistic content.

• **Journalists, communicators, and other press professionals** must report aggressions suffered while working, seeking support within the newsrooms, with the public authorities and civil society organizations defending press freedom, and using their voices to combat the violence other colleagues suffer.
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3. About the Future, 50
In 2023, 330 alerts were recorded for press freedom violations in Brazil. It shows a reduction of 40.7% compared to the previous year.

47.2% of the cases were of stigmatizing discourses

38.2% of violent episodes involved physical aggression, intimidation, threats, and/or destruction of equipment

55.7% had state agents as perpetrators

49.7% of the cases had men as perpetrators

52.1% of the attacks originated or had backlashes on the Internet

Brasília (DF) was the main stage of the attacks

There were 82 explicit gender attacks and/or assaults on women journalists, 43.4% less than the previous year.

121 cases targeted media outlets and media in general

229 victims were individuals, such as journalists, photojournalists, and other press professionals
1. Introduction

a. About the Present

This report marks the fifth consecutive year in which Abraji systematically conducts the Monitoring of Attacks on Journalists in Brazil, following the methodology developed by the Voces del Sur Network. The Network currently comprises 17 organizations from Latin America and the Caribbean. Together, they follow the development of their countries toward SDG 16.10.01, an indicator focused on freedom of expression and the press and violations against the work of journalism. Regional analyses are published annually in a Shadow Report produced by the Network. The more in-depth analyses of the domestic scenario—with references and results of other monitoring carried out by Abraji—are condensed in this edition.

Focused on 2023, this report brings for the first time a complete analysis of the trends and results related to the new composition of government that took office for the 2023-2026 term. It reflects on the transition panorama after four years of a government policy that elected the press as one of its main enemies and nurtured a feeling of distrust in the work of journalists and communicators to
its supporters and the general population. The new scenario raises many questions about the future framework of freedom of the press and the security of its professionals in Brazil. This publication tries to contribute to this debate.

The shift in the political sphere also directly impacted the monitoring methodology, which underwent a reassessment process to determine the main actors monitored within the new National Congress, considering the frequency of attacks against the press on online platforms. This required an adjustment in social media data collection (X/Twitter), with an exploratory analysis carried out in the first months of 2023. These points will be detailed in a specific section of this report.

Despite the necessary adjustments, the monitoring continued following the same indicators and collected data from several variables that helped to understand the risks and threats to journalism in Brazil. Brazil’s history of press freedom violations is long and worrying, and it continues to demand systematic and attentive monitoring of the new challenges that continue to arise.

b. About the Past

In addition to the annual report published by Abraji, other documents and analyses are also part of the monitoring. As already presented, the data compiled by the organization is shared with the VdS network, which annually publishes its Shadow Reports. Although it follows the same methodology, the regional report includes other data-collecting methods and clearing criteria to ensure comparable metrics between countries. Therefore, the unit of analysis has undergone some changes, which results in a disparity in the numbers.
Since 2021, Abraji has also carried out a monitoring primarily focused on gender issues—the project Gender Violence Against Journalists. After its first year, when a research-specific report was printed, data on gender-based violence began to be included in the annual general report on attacks on the press. There is a chapter solely for this purpose.

Finally, in 2023 Abraji published another more concise and partial material, in addition to its annual report, bringing specific analyses on a trend or relevant aspect of violence against journalists in that context. The first product of this kind was the report Silencing the Messenger: The Impacts of Political Violence on Journalists in Brazil. It analyzed political violence at the beginning of last year (2023) and presented the first portrait of the position of the new National Congress about the press on social networks.

c. About Monitoring

The monitoring methodology followed by Abraji has the alert as a unit of analysis. Each alert is equivalent to an episode of violence against press professionals defined by parameters that involve basic information about the case, the targets, and the perpetrators, as well as cross-sectional indicators dealing with gender and the digital characteristics of the attacks.

In each case, information is collected on location—city, state, and region—, type of aggression, and date of the attack, enabling a longitudinal analysis, considering data collected over time, of violence against journalists in Brazil. Data on the targets include the type of professional attacked—whether it is, for example, a reporter, editor,
photojournalist, press worker, or content producer, or if the episode impacts an outlet, organization, or media in a generic way—age group, and media, gender, and other cross factors such as race and ethnicity.

Perpetrators are divided among state, non-state, parastate actors, groups outside the law, and unidentified. When possible, the gender of the perpetrators is also recorded. Finally, there are cross-sectional indicators that assess whether the cases have origin or backlashes on the Internet, especially on social media, and whether the alert has explicit traces of gender violence. Gender aggressions are distributed in eight categories of detail and motivation, as follows:

1. Questioning skills due to gender;
2. Chauvinistic, homophobic, biphobic, or transphobic comments;
3. Chauvinistic, homophobic, biphobic or transphobic acts;
4. Act of sexual violence;
5. Differentiated labor violence;
6. Differentiated digital violence;
7. Murder related to gender identity or sexual orientation;
8. Attack motivated by content on gender.

This report has a chapter on gender violence against journalists. Data and examples of these categories will

3 The Voces del Sur network maintains nine categories in its methodology. The difference between the network approach and the approach applied by Abraji is the category “Feminicide” which, for VdS, is separated from “gender identity-related murder or sexual orientation.” For Abraji, these groups overlap.
be covered in this section. Click here to skip to the chapter on gender.

Having the alert as a unit of analysis means that the data presented in this report are calculated based on the number and rate of episodes of aggression for each variable and category. An alert may show more than one target, perpetrator, type of aggression, and reason for gender violence. It is not possible, however, to have different entries for the date and location variables. This video provides other details of the methodology—such as the collection sources and the description of the research variables.

Guide to navigating this report

Some symbols and images on the pages of this publication indicate the existence of extra materials:

- The player signals that there are videos to be watched.
- This is the symbol for graphics, charts, and interactive, maps.
2. Attacks on Journalism in 2023

a. About the Variables

The main variables of monitoring and their categories:

**Types of Targets**
- Reporters and Communication Analysts
- Editors, Directors, Media Executives
- Photographers and Camerapeople
- Media Outlets
- Media Workers
- Independent Reporters
- Producers of Journalistic Content

**Types of Perpetrators**
- State
- Non-state
- Parastate
- Groups Outside the Law
- Unidentified
Types of Aggression

Murders: Intentional murder of journalists (when connected to work).

Torture: An act by which pain, intimidation, coercion, or serious suffering, whether physical or mental, are intentionally inflicted on journalists.

Forced Disappearance: Any form of deprivation of freedom of journalists caused by government agents, groups or persons acting on behalf of or with the support of the State and refusing to reveal the whereabouts of the missing journalist.

Arbitrary Detention: Arrest, imprisonment, or detention of journalists without a fair trial or legal basis justifying deprivation of liberty.

Kidnapping: Kidnapping and unlawful retention of one or more journalists against their will.

Aggression and Attacks: Violent, intimidating, or limiting actions against journalists or media.

Abusive Use of State Power: Actions planned, proposed, and executed by state agents who abuse their power, harm journalists and media, or prevent them from doing their work.

Civil and Criminal Judicial Proceedings: Trial of private or public actions whose consequences may include fines and imprisonment.

Legal Norm Contrary to Standards: Proposal and/or approval of norms, which may include laws, decrees, regulations, resolutions and/or ordinances, that restrict freedom of the press, expression, and the right to access information and/or generate censorship.
Restrictions on Access to Information: Intentional ways of making accessing information of public interest difficult.

Stigmatizing Discourses: Verbal attacks carried out publicly to discredit journalists or media.

Restrictions on the Internet: Preventing and/or limiting freedom of expression and press on the Internet using online tools.

Sexual Violence: Attempts, comments, assaults and/or unwanted sexual acts, both in physical and digital spaces.

To deepen the analysis of the cases that fall into the category Aggressions and Attacks, Abraji unfolded the indicator into eight new subcategories—which are not part of the methodology shared by the organization’s members of the Voces del Sur Network:

- Physical Aggression
- Attack on Outlets’ Offices
- Destruction or Seizure of Equipment
- Forced Displacement
- Serious Threats and Cyber Threats
- Intimidation and Persecution
- Murder of Family Members
- Attempted Murder
b. Main Results

i. Historical Series

Since 2019, there has been a growing trend in the number of violations recorded by the Abraji’s monitoring of attacks, which reached its peak in the election year 2022, with 557 episodes of aggression to the press. However, 2023 was a year of countertrend, presenting—for the first time in the last four years—a drop in alerts collected and categorized by the project—330 throughout the year. This change of scenario—illustrated in the chart below—concerns the total number of alerts—it does not mean, as you can see elsewhere in this report, that violence against journalists has ceased in Brazil.

![Attacks on Journalists Over the Years](chart)

Despite the decrease in alerts, the total number of cases in 2023 is still higher than that recorded in 2019, the first year of the Bolsonaro administration. However, it is less than the figure of 2020, when the combination of the pandemic and anti-media government policy was...
responsible for the first significant increase in the number of press freedom violations in the country.\footnote{It is important to point out that, in addition to suffering the impacts of the political, social, and sanitary contexts of the period, the monitoring has undergone refinements in its methodology over the years, becoming more effective in identifying and categorizing episodes of violence against the press.}

In this fifth year of systematic monitoring, the report brings the record of 330 episodes in which there was some threat to journalistic work in the country. January 2023 stood out as the period in which more attacks were observed, especially by the episode on the 8th, when former President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) supporters attacked the headquarters of the three branches of government in Brasília (DF). Journalists on the site were subjected to verbal and physical assaults, intimidation, and threats, as well as the destruction and seizure of their equipment. In the following days, aggression against the press continued to be recorded. They included episodes recorded during the emptying of the camps set in front of military barracks in different Brazilian cities, taken by groups of the same political orientation as those responsible for the anti-democratic acts.

After this peak of 49 assaults in the first month of the year, the monthly number of cases fluctuated, maintaining an average that did not exceed 35 attacks per month, reaching the lowest number of 14 alerts in September—a scenario very different from that found in 2022, when the peak of attacks was recorded, precisely, in September, in the pre-election period.
**Attacks per Month**

Number of cases throughout 2023

![Graph showing attacks per month]

**ii. Regionalization of Attacks**

As in 2022, the Southeast and Midwest regions concentrated most of the attacks recorded. However, the order was reversed: While in the previous year, the Southeast region registered more alerts, in 2023, the Midwest topped the list with more assaults on the press, bringing together 43.9% of the total episodes classified by the monitoring.

**Cases by Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MidWest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Southeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The change has two main reasons: The first is due to the attacks of January 8 on the headquarters of the three branches in Brasília (DF). As seen in the previous section, January was the month with the most alerts of aggression due to the episode of political violence that took over Brasília. The other reason for the increase in attacks in the Midwest is connected to the social network analysis carried out by our monitoring. Due to the changes in the political scenario of the country after the 2022 elections, the monitoring began to investigate, in an exploratory way, tweets about the press\(^5\) published by members of the National Congress and President Lula (PT) throughout 2023 to identify violations of press freedom perpetrated in social networks. The attacks identified in this process were recorded as being in Brasília because they had, as authors, members of the Congress or the Federal Executive branch based in Brasília.

Alerts with a region classified as “Not Applicable” occurred outside the country, such as the case of a Brazilian journalist in the West Bank, who was intimidated and had his equipment confiscated by the IDF (Israeli Armed Forces) in July\(^6\). This group also gathers episodes that occurred online and do not fit into the analysis of the social networks of Senators and Federal Congresspeople.

After Brasília (DF), which counted 39.7% of the total cases recorded in the year, the locations with the highest number of attacks on newspapers and journalists were the

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5 The methodology and results of the X/Twitter analysis are presented in the “Online Violence” section of the chapter “Attacks on Journalism in 2023.”

state of São Paulo (16.6%), followed by the states of Rio de Janeiro (7.3%) and Rio Grande do Sul (3.9%).

It is worth repeating the same observation included in the 2022 report: one of the obstacles Abraji’s monitoring faces is underreporting, that is, the difficulty of accessing some cases of violence against communicators in different parts of the country. Cases that gain voice and breadth are usually severe or involve professionals from large media and national scope companies, concentrated in states of the Southeast regions, which not only gather more media companies but are also headquarters for outlets of greater reach and visibility. This makes some aggressions more easily recorded, while others, which occurred in smaller cities and outlets, are identified with more difficulty. The results presented in this report reflect these circumstances. Understanding the limitations of this and any other study is essential to establish a transparent dialogue about its data.

### Cases per state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Cases</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>SC</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>North</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>AC</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cases per state

No data registered

CLICK HERE TO ACCESS THE INTERACTIVE MAP

1  131
### iii. Types of Aggression

For another year, Stigmatizing Discourses were the primary form of attack on press workers in Brazil. Of the 330 cases recorded in 2023, 47.3% were classified within this category, which includes the different verbal aggressions against communicators. In 2022, the proportion was higher: 61.2% of the alerts involved Stigmatizing Discourses. The change of scenario is linked to the proportional increase in episodes of physical aggression, threats, intimidation, persecution, and destruction of equipment – situations that fall into the category of Aggressions and Attacks – that corresponded to 31.2% of the cases of the previous year and represented 38.2% of the attacks in 2023. This picture is linked to January’s anti-democratic acts, which were a violent response from former President Jair Bolsonaro’s supporters to the result of the presidential elections and targeted several journalists, photojournalists, camerapeople, and media workers in general7.

As for the cases of Stigmatizing Speech, 73.7% involved state agents, such as public officials and political actors with active seats, and 85.9% occurred in the online environment. Once again, the data points to a pattern of attacks already identified in other years of monitoring: tools such as social networks are often used to undermine the credibility of journalists in Brazil, mainly by political agents who frequently mobilize their online followers in discrediting campaigns against professionals and outlets.

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7 A more in-depth analysis of this scenario was made in the 2023.1 report published by Abraji, entitled “Silencing the messenger: The impacts of political violence against journalists in Brazil”.
In Aggressions and Attacks, 37.3% of the alerts—corresponding to 47 cases—involved unidentified aggressors. In this group, 34% of the perpetrators of attacks—more than a third of these episodes—were registered as former President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) supporters. Again, this reflects the strong political violence at the beginning of the year.

To better understand the violence suffered by journalists in Brazil, Abraji fragmented the category which deals with serious situations more generally into eight new subcategories, presented in the “About the Variables” section of the report’s introduction chapter. The one that stood out most throughout 2023 was Physical Aggression, appearing in 40.5% of the cases in this group. Next, the subcategories of Serious Threats and Cyber Threats (35.7%) and Intimidation and Persecution (22.2%) were highlighted.
In August, a reporter specialized in police coverage on TV Vitoria, an affiliated with Record group in the state of Espírito Santo, received virtual death threats after being exposed by Alexandre Ramalho, state secretary of Public Security and Social Defense, on his social media channels. The state agent tried to discredit her after an interview about the death of five men in Morro do Macaco. Months later, in December, a journalist from Aracaju (state of Sergipe) was intimidated for covering political issues. In an audio message on social media, the perpetrator, apparently drunk, says that it is “cowardice” of her to publish reports about the mayors of the state. The man still calls the reporter “a hottie,” setting up gender violence. These are just a few examples of aggression recorded in the group Aggression and Attacks subcategories throughout 2023.

The proportion of attacks classified as Civil and Criminal Proceedings has also increased considerably. In the previous year, this category represented 2.1% of the alerts. In 2023, it reached 7.9%. Among the cases of this class,

8 Available at: https://www.abraji.org.br/noticias/abraji-condena-atitude-de-autoridade-que-gerou-ataques-contra-reporter
there is the judicial censorship obtained by the Speaker of the State Congress of Paraná, Ademar Traiano (PSD-PR), against “Jornal Plural” and Grupo Globo—including the portal G1, GloboNews, the affiliate RPC and other broadcasters—for contents about a complaint filed in a plea bargain. The speaker of the National Congress, Arthur Lira (PP-AL), also used the courts to try to silence press outlets throughout the year. In July, he went to the courts of Brasília to censor, as a matter of urgency, a report on the accusations of sexual violence made by his ex-wife. The report was disclosed by “Agência Pública.” Lira also asked for the withdrawal of the “ICL Noticias” program on June 6, broadcast by TVT and YouTube. Lira used similar resources in an attempt to take out content published by “Congresso em Foco” on the same subject.

A journalist’s murder in Guarujá (SP) was registered in December 2023. It is believed that the independent reporter and pre-candidate for mayor of the city was executed for his reporting content related to the relationship of the health sector, politics, and public money use.

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9 Available at: https://www.abraji.org.br/organizacoes-de-defesa-da-liberdade-de-imprensa-repudiam-censura-judicial-obtida-por-presidente-da-assembleia-legislativa-do-parana

10 Available at: https://www.abraji.org.br/organizacoes-de-defesa-do-jornalismo-repudiam-tentativa-de-arthur-lira-de-silenciar-meios-de-comunicacao

11 Available at: https://abraji.org.br/noticias/organizacoes-de-defesa-do-jornalismo-repudiam-nova-ofensiva-de-arthur-lira-contra-a-liberdade-de-imprensa

12 Available at: https://g1.globo.com/sp/santos-regiao/noticia/2023/12/28/video-mostra-execucao-de-reporter-e-pre-candidato-a-prefeito-no-litoral-de-sp.ghtml
For the third consecutive year, state agents emerged as the main aggressors of journalists in Brazil, present in 55.7% of the alerts recorded in 2023. It happened in a year marked by the explosion of violence of civilians who invaded and shattered public buildings as retaliation after the result of the democratic election that led to the defeat of Jair Bolsonaro (PL) in 2022. The January episodes were the precise results of the political violence that has been fueled and nurtured by actors in a position of power, who use their reach and visibility to discredit Brazilian journalism and thus weaken democracy.

After the state actors, the perpetrators that most appeared in the monitoring were classified as “Non-State,” appearing in 23.9% of the attacks—far below the top. This class has perpetrators of aggression who may or may not be known actors, but who do not perform in public positions and who could be identified by the monitoring team. This is the case of evangelical pastor Silas Malafaia, who called
the Brazilian press “mediocre, partial, and unscrupulous” for reporting the episode of pieces of Saudi jewelry that members of the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) would have tried to bring to Brazil without declaring them to customs and the Federal Revenue. The group of Unidentified (22.7%) included mainly Internet users and demonstrators in tune with the pro-Bolsonaro protests.

Most of the perpetrators of 2023 are men (49.7%). In the gender category “Not Applicable” are the unidentified groups and institutions as perpetrators.

The list of main aggressors in 2023 is led by Federal Congresswoman Carla Zambelli (PL-SP), who was involved in 36 attacks, mainly stigmatizing discourses on social networks. The other Congresspeople of this group also have, for the most part, participated in cases of disbelief and offense of journalists, media, and journalism in their online platforms. There is a section to analyze the attacks and criticisms of members of the National Congress to the Brazilian press on X/Twitter.

13 Available at: https://www.poder360.com.br/brasil/malafaia-defende-bolsonaro-e-critica-imprensa-por-caso-das-joias/
Main Perpetrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congresswoman Carla Zambelli (PL-SP)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolsonaro supporters</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressman Carlos Zarattini (PT-SP)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congresswoman Bia Kicis (PL-DF)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Flavio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressman Alencar Santana (PT-SP)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressman Osmar Terra (MDB-RS)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressman Nikolas Ferreira (PL-MG)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Magno Malta (PL-ES)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

v. Targets

Following last year’s trend, the main targets of attacks are Reporters and Communication Analysts (48.5%). In second place is the group that includes legal entities with varied media and generically mentions to the press (36.6%)—common targets in verbal attacks, especially those that occur in social media. Although the category of reporters and analysts had already appeared at the top of the list of attacks in the last report (2022), in 2023, there were more significant differences between that group and the media and the press class in general—it’s of nearly **twelve percentage points** compared to the **1.6 percentage points** the previous year. The second category lost space between the 2023 targets, meaning the attacks were more direct and customized.
The different categories of monitoring targets include photojournalists, editors, executives and directors of outlets, freelance journalists, journalistic content producers, and other press workers, such as drivers and other contractors. It is worth noting that these professionals also suffer from violence against the press, albeit to a lesser extent, and must be the subject of protection and prevention actions.

### Types of Targets

- **Reporters and communication analysts** 48.5%
- **Media outlets and press in general** 36.6%
- **Photographers and camerapeople** 8.8%
- **Editors, directors, media executives** 4.5%
- **Independent Reporters** 4.5%
- **Producers of Journalistic Content** 2.1%
- **Media Workers** 0.9%

Another relevant data presented by monitoring is about the gender of the targets. In 38.5% of cases, this information does not apply because it was aimed at the media or the press in general—such as when groups or individuals attack “the media,” “the press,” “journalism,” or other generic ways about journalistic activity and its professionals and vehicles. In other cases, there is a predominance of male targets (40.9% of the total alerts), followed by 22.7% of cases in which a woman, cis or trans, was involved.
The 2023 report stands out for advancing the recognition of gender diversity in journalism, registering 0.3% of targets as non-binary people\textsuperscript{14}. Violations that have affected women (cis or trans) and non-binary people are analyzed more thoroughly in the chapter on gender monitoring, which includes violence against LGBTQIA+ professionals.

### Target Genre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (cis and trans)</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-binary</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the monitoring records information about the age group of victims. This information is not always found. Therefore, in the chart below, it is possible to notice a swelling in the “Not Determined” category. Among the cases in which the information was obtained, it was identified that most of the targets are between 25 and 39 years or between 40 and 60 years, both counting for 7.6% of the cases. A probable explanation for this number is that this is today’s predominant age group among professionals active

\textsuperscript{14} But there is still a long way to go to improve the scope of monitoring and circumvent the underreporting of cases of violence involving gender.
in the labor market. They were marked as Not Applicable cases where the targets involved were not individuals.

**Target Age Range**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 to 24</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 39</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 60</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not determined</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c. Gender Violence**

**i. Methodology**

Since 2021, Abraji has been monitoring gender violence against journalists in Brazil. The project—which began with the sponsorship of UNESCO’s “Global Media Defense Fund” but became an independent initiative in 2022—sheds light on the scenario of attacks on women journalists and LGBTQIA+ professionals, especially when aggression involves sexuality, gender identity, and oppressive stereotypes on these themes. The objective of the survey is to scale the problem, identify the main aggressors, and reveal patterns connected to this type of violence. With this diagnosis, thinking about more effective actions and interventions to combat the situation is possible.

The project works in favor of targets number 5 (Gender Equality) and 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) of the UN Agenda 2030. Among the main challenges of
the research are the underreporting of cases and the complexity of defining what can be considered a gender attack. In the sexist society in which we live, denouncing aggressions involving gender and sexuality is an act marked by stigmas and, often, situations of re-victimization. This causes many cases of violence to remain in the dark, with no solution, accountability, and support for victims. The purpose of monitoring is to give voice to such silencing.

To circumvent this gap, the survey seeks different sources of collection, such as news alerts, collection of data from X/Twitter, and reports from partner organizations, outlets, and communication professionals. Although it does not definitively solve the problem of underreporting, the strategy allows us to get closer to the actual scenario of gender attacks on journalists.

As well as monitoring general attacks on the press, the gender-focused survey also has the alert, or the case, as a unit of analysis. The quantitative variables detailing each episode involve information about the victim(s), the outlet for which they work, the type of journalistic coverage that caused the attack, information about the perpetrator(s), the kind of aggression, recording of aggression in the digital environment; and analysis of the gender components identified in the attack.

The variables of aggression are those existing in general monitoring. Since the survey is more comprehensive, an attack can involve more than one type of aggression, victim, and perpetrator.

In 2022, the Voces del Sur network also included the gender perspective in its monitoring, extending this analysis to all its member countries. The inclusion came after the creation of the 13th indicator of aggression for sexual violence, in addition to the cross-sectional category of attack motivated by gender. To review specific categories
for gender aggressions focused on detailing and motivation for attacks, click here.

ii. Data and Analysis

Gender monitoring follows the trend established by the follow-up of general attacks on the press. There was a drop in cases compared to the previous year, from 145 in 2022 to 82 in 2023. This decrease reaches 43.4%.

In 2021, the project recorded 119 cases of gender-related violence against press workers and/or assaults on female journalists in Brazil. This means that, from there to now, the scenario has oscillated, suffering a 13.1% increase between the last two years of Jair Bolsonaro’s administration and going through a reduction that placed it at the level of 82 cases in the first year of Lula (PT) back to the government.

Of all the cases recorded in this branch of the survey, 32 (39%) presented explicit gender attacks with offenses and/or acts clearly sexist, homophobic, biphobic, or transphobic; questioning of capacities; acts of sexual violence; and differentiated forms of labor and digital violence. The other cases in this section of monitoring (50) are more general assaults on female journalists, cis or trans, since the project assumes a broad and complex view of gender, understanding that this type of violence is something systemic and rooted in society. Therefore, dealing with attacks on women demands dealing with sexism and structural forms of oppression, even if they are not so evident.

Cis and trans women were victims in 78.1% of the 32 episodes of explicit gender violence. In this group, 52% of the cases involved explicitly sexist, misogynist, or transphobic comments. One example is an attack on the Brazilian correspondent of the US newspaper “The Washington Post,”
Marina Dias. The journalist covered the anti-democratic acts of January 8, 2023, in Brasília (DF), when she was cornered and physically assaulted by Bolsonaro supporters. In addition to physical violence, Dias suffered evident gender violence by hearing chauvinistic offenses from her aggressors. This emblematic case was told in the report *Silencing the Messenger: The Impacts of Political Violence Against Journalists in Brazil*, released by Abraji in the first half of 2023.

In 20% of the attacks on women journalists, they were targets of explicitly chauvinistic, transphobic, or misogynist acts. This is what happened on February 19 when “247” website columnist Sara York was assaulted by one of the secretaries of the city hall of São Pedro da Aldeia (RJ) and by security guards when trying to cover the Carnival event of the city. A trans woman, York was choked and removed from the stage of the event, even though she was allowed to be on the spot. In April, Alana Rocha, a trans woman and then reporter for Radio Gazeta FM, had her car stoned while working. Both cases are also examples of transphobia, identified in 3.6% of episodes of explicit gender violence in 2023.

The Internet played a prominent role in the scenario of attacks on women journalists, both cis and trans: 12% of cases were classified as Differentiated Digital Violence, which are harassment, threats, intimidation, and online offenses motivated or aggravated by gender. One of the episodes of this category involves sports journalist Bianca

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15 Abraji’s note on the case is available at: [https://www.abraji.org.br/abraji-repudia-ataques-transfobicos-a-jornalistas](https://www.abraji.org.br/abraji-repudia-ataques-transfobicos-a-jornalistas)

16 Here, it is essential to remember that underreporting is one of the limitations of the research. It is possible that several cases of transphobia are not recorded by monitoring because they do not reach the research team, since many situations are not denounced due to the stigma that accompanies cases of gender violence.
Molina, who covered the Women’s World Cup for “CaZé TV.” Molina received, via a message on social Network, an unsolicited photo of the intimate parts of an Internet user\textsuperscript{17}. The sexual harassment case took place in July.

Differentiated labor violence marked \textbf{8\%} of explicit gender attacks against women in 2023. In May, Ana Claudia Prado Cosme, a journalist who works for the city hall of Rosário Oeste (state of Mato Grosso), 128 km from the capital city Cuiabá, was attacked by covering a bidding meeting in the city council. During the episode, the professional was offended and filmed with the intention of intimidation by Councilors Ademir Figueiredo (MDB-MT) and João Augusto de Arruda (PTB-MT), known as Tito da Forquilha. Figueiredo would still have told the professional that she “was no one” and that he was an authority in the region\textsuperscript{18}.

In \textbf{4\%} of the cases that victimized women, sexual violence situations were identified. Bianca Chaboudet, a reporter for InterTV, affiliated with Globo in Rio de Janeiro, reported live on actions against drowning in Maricá (RJ) when a man tried to kiss her. “At that moment, I did not know what could happen if he would come back; I was trembling,” Chaboudet said in an interview with Rede Globo’s “Encontro” show in October. The journalist told the audience that harassment is a crime and said she would report the case to the police\textsuperscript{19}.

Finally, the Ability Questioning category also appeared in \textbf{4\%} of attacks on women journalists. In March, during

\textsuperscript{17} Available at: https://revistaforum.com.br/midia/2023/7/20/infeliz-envia-foto-do-pnis-para-bianca-molina-jornalista-que-cobre-copa-do-mundo-feminina-139838.html.

\textsuperscript{18} Available at: https://www.reportermt.com/geral/jornalista-e-xingada-e-intimida-por-vereadores-ao-cobrir-reuniao-em-mt/190208

a CNN Brasil program, the Minister of the Secretariat of Communication of the Presidency of the Republic (SECOM), Paulo Pimenta, tried to disqualify presenter Raquel Landim by questioning whether the professional was a journalist after a question that displeased him. Landim shared a video of the moment on social media and wrote: “Yes, I’m a journalist. My role is to ask the questions; that of public authority should be to bring the clarifications.20"

As for the aggressors of communicators, 60% are men, 32% could not have their gender identified—here, aggressors whose gender does not apply, such as groups, institutions, and anonymous Internet users—and 8% are women.

Among men21 who suffered gender attacks—18.7% of the 32 cases of explicit violence—66.6% were victims of homophobic comments. It is essential to point out that not all journalists who have suffered from homophobic offenses identify themselves as LGBTQIA+. This form of attack is often used as a strategy to denigrate and discredit, starting from a macho and heteronormative idea that specific identities or sexualities are inferior, less capable, and less worthy of occupying certain social, political, and professional spaces.

In 16.6% of gender alerts that hit men, cases of sexual harassment were identified. In February, reporter Rodrigo de Luna of TV Guararapes, an affiliate of TV Record, was forcibly kissed during a live broadcast on the Galo da Madrugada Carnival parade in Recife (PE).22 Also, in 16.5% of the alerts, journalists faced Digital Violence, such as the

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20 Available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/CqMnopgtZFh/
21 The monitoring did not identify cases that victimized trans men in 2023.
threats of rape and death suffered by a communicator from the state of Rio Grande do Norte in October 2023.

The situation of perpetrators changes when cases of gender violence against journalists are considered. In 50% of the episodes, it was impossible to identify or record the gender of the perpetrators. The aggressors were women in 33.3% of the cases, and in 16.6% the perpetrators were men.

The 2023 monitoring recorded a case against a non-binary journalist. The victim self-identifies as a trans-male person and was the target of stigmatizing speech online in April.

Of the 75 attacks targeted at women communicators—cis and trans, general and explicitly connected to gender—54.6% involved coverage of political issues, showing that the field is still hostile to women—in 2022, this figure was 62.7%. In addition, 50.6% of the assaults on women journalists had backlashes or origin in the online environment.
Data from Explicit Gender Violence
32 attacks recorded in 2023

Gender of Victims

- Woman (cis and transgender) (78.1%)
- Man (18.7%)
- Non-binary (3.1%)

Types of Explicit Gender Violence
About the 32 cases recorded in 2023

- Chauvinistic, homophobic, biphobic, or transphobic comments: 56.2%
- Sexist, transphobic and/or misogynist acts: 15.6%
- Differentiated digital violence: 12.5%
- Differentiated labor violence: 6.2%
- Sexual violence: 6.2%
- Questioning of ability: 3.1%

Genero de los agresores

- Woman (12.5%)
- Man (50%)
- Not applicable (34.4%)
d. Online Violence

By monitoring the government, journalists are in the delicate situation of asking questions that may be uncomfortable to authorities. Their work of investigating and disseminating information relevant to the population ensures that people in power are transparent in their actions and held accountable when they go against the interests of democracy and the citizens. Such an activity has risks, as shown throughout this report. In addition to the violence they can suffer on the streets, press workers are also frequent targets in the online environment. Sometimes, the perpetrators of the attacks are state agents, who use their profiles and channels on the Internet to curtail the freedom of the press and make the work of communicators and communicators even more difficult. This chapter focuses on data analysis of the demonstrations of Brazilian political actors on X (formerly Twitter) to identify attacks on journalists, media, and the press in general.

i. Methodology

Abraji monitoring has collected and analyzed social media content since 2021. The work consists of identifying threats and stigmatizing discourses against journalists and media on X/Twitter, seeking cases using keywords23, and following profiles of political actors relevant to the national scenario—which already have a history of attacks on press freedom.

Until 2022, data collection was done with the help of the rtweet package for the R programming environment. However, the platform's access policy to the API changed

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in 2023, causing the monitoring team to adjust the methodology. In the last year, the collection began to be carried out using the tools provided by the Junkipedia project.

In addition, the list of monitored profiles was updated, since, in 2023, the federal government and the seats of the National Congress changed. The X account of former President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) was no longer monitored and was replaced by the profile of the new head of the Brazilian executive, Lula (PT). All Senators and Federal Congresspeople with X/Twitter profiles active in early 2023—and that could be found with Internet search engines—were included in the search.

The first analysis with the methodological adjustments was made in May 2023 and published in the report “Silencing the Messenger: The Impacts of Political Violence against Journalists in Brazil”. At the time, the initial list of monitored accounts had 535 profiles among the 594 Congresspeople who hold mandates in the National Congress, considering only those who made any post between January 1 and May 15, 2023. Then, a smaller group was created, only with accounts that tweeted about the press, using the selection terms: “journalist,” “journalists,” “newspaper,” “journalism,” “press,” “media,” “blogger,” “communicator,” and “communication.” The keywords database comprised 794 publications by 233 congresspeople—43.5% of the initial list24.

The average of tweets about the press—or any other key term in the survey—was approximately 3 for each of the 233 Congresspeople. However, 63.1% of these profiles were below the calculated average, posting between one and two posts on the subject. This means that a few political actors stood out with a more significant number of publications: There were 13 accounts above average,

24 The initial database is available here.
or 5.6% of the total profiles that mentioned the press in the first months of 2023. This group was responsible for more than a third of the 794 tweets with the keywords. The names are displayed in descending order in the list below. The colors of the lines represent the positioning of their parties in the political-ideological spectrum: Blue for those placed more on the left, red for those who are more on the right, gray for the center.

### Congresspeople who mentioned the press the most
Between January 1 and May 15, 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (party)</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of initial tweets*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Zarattini (PT-SP)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmar Terra (MDB-RS)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alencar Santana (PT-SP)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolas Ferreira (PL-MG)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duarte Jr. (PSB-MA)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bia Kicis (PL-DF)</td>
<td>Congresswoman</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carla Zambelli (PL-SP)</td>
<td>Congresswoman</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 The research carried out this division considering the positioning of parliamentarians’ parties on the political-ideological spectrum, although it recognizes that some political actors may position themselves on the scale in a slightly different way than their parties. This was a methodological choice, considering the large number of academic works and tools that make it easier to locate the position of parties on the spectrum. For this study, the positioning of the parties was based on the metrics published by Folha de S. Paulo in 2022. Available at: [https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2022/09/o-que-faz-um-partido-ser-de-direita-ou-esquerda-folha-cria-metrica-que-posiciona-legendas.shtml](https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2022/09/o-que-faz-um-partido-ser-de-direita-ou-esquerda-folha-cria-metrica-que-posiciona-legendas.shtml)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (party)</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of initial tweets*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magno Malta (PL-ES)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos Pontes (PL-SP)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipe Barros (PL-PR)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos do Val (PODE-ES)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reginete Bispo (PT-RS)</td>
<td>Congresswoman</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td></td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tweets posted up to May 15, 2023. Time cut of the first stage of the survey

The screening phase of the profiles served as a basis for monitoring Legislative branch members for the rest of the year. The accounts that were above the average of tweets about the press were followed throughout 2023, and their publications were submitted to lexical analysis—in search of the keywords of the research—and content analysis to identify posts that exceeded the limit of criticism and configured attacks on journalists and journalism. The following section brings the main results of this study.

**ii. Data and Analysis**

*Abraji’s 2023.1 report*—focused on political violence against journalists—found that some political agents who most mentioned the press on X/Twitter during the first months of 2023 were names already present in other years of monitoring. This is the case of Senator Flavio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ), the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, and Federal Congresswomen Carla Zambelli (PL-SP) and Bia Kicis (PL-DF), who have been systematically attacking the press for a long time.
The list contains figures to the right, the center, and the left of the political-ideological spectrum. Many of the Congresspeople included in this group were part of the support base of the former President Bolsonaro (PL). The following chart shows a list of the political agents who mentioned the press most throughout 2023. These data differ from those presented in the previous chart because they combine all the publications made last year—not just what was posted until May 15.

### Congresspeople who mentioned the press the most
Tweets posted throughout 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (party)</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Total # in 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Zarattini (PT-SP)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carla Zambelli (PL-SP)</td>
<td>Congresswoman</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alencar Santana (PT-SP)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmar Terra (MDB-RS)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bia Kicis (PL-DF)</td>
<td>Congresswoman</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolas Ferreira (PL-MG)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duarte Jr. (PSB-MA)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reginete Bispo (PT-RS)</td>
<td>Congresswoman</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magno Malta (PL-ES)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos do Val (PODE-ES)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos Pontes (PL-SP)</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipe Barros (PL-PR)</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>585</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the first part of the survey, published in the middle of 2023, 286 tweets from the 13 selected accounts were analyzed. As stated above, publications mentioned newspapers, journalists, communicators and/or journalism. To understand if the texts presented attacks, submitting them to content analysis was necessary. This monitoring phase revealed that 19.2% of tweets had criticism, and 30.8% contained attacks on the Brazilian press.

In the second part, another 444 publications between May 16 and December 31 entered the analysis, totaling 605 tweets investigated in 2023. In this new set, 27% contained criticism, and 16.4% had attacks on the media. Therefore, 26.5% of the 605 posts had attacks, and 43.3% had criticism—the other tweets mentioned the keywords in neutral or commendable contexts.

Here, it is important to differentiate criticism from attack. While the first is essential for freedom of expression and presents valid points that must be reviewed and improved in the journalistic work, the second seeks to undermine the credibility of Brazilian journalism and weaken the freedom of the press, stating, for example, that press professionals lie and manipulate, are unreliable, and conspire against certain groups—whether they are political, social, religious or economic.

In the first months of 2023, the Congresspeople who proportionally attacked the press were Senators Flavio Bolsonaro (87.5% of his posts mentioning the press were attacks) and Magno Malta (72.7%), accompanied by Congresswoman Carla Zambelli (50%). The complete table with the data for this research step is available in the Silencing the Messenger report.

26 The database is available here.
For the whole year, the scenario has changed little. Flavio Bolsonaro and Magno Malta keep topping the list, but in reverse positions: Malta leads, with 56.2% of his tweets mentioning the press being identified as attacks, and Flavio Bolsonaro comes in second place, with 53.5% of his posts attacking newspapers, journalists and journalism. The third place belongs to Congressman Filipe Barros (PL-PR), who rose a position concerning the previous list and established his place with 50% of attacks in the publications on the media, leaving Carla Zambelli behind, with 44.1%.

### Parliamentarians who attacked the press most
Analysis of tweets published throughout 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (party)</th>
<th>% of Attacks atasques</th>
<th>% of Tweets about the press</th>
<th>% of attacks of # of posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magno Malta (PL-ES)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipe Barros (PL-PR)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carla Zambelli (PL-SP)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bia Kicis (PL-DF)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Zarattini (PT-SP)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmar Terra (MDB-RS)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolas Ferreira (PL-MG)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alencar Santana (PT-SP)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (party)</td>
<td>% of Attacks</td>
<td>% of Tweets</td>
<td>Tweets about the press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos do Val (PODE-ES)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reginete Bispo (PT-RS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duarte Jr. (PSB-MA)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos Pontes (PL-SP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The narratives sustained in the attacks followed the same pattern identified in early 2023. Regardless of the political-ideological positioning, the Legislative members fed perceptions of a hostile media, always opposed and unfavorable to the political groups to which they belong. This generates the paradox that, intentionally and maliciously, the Brazilian press is a defender and executioner of the same figures and parties. Examples of this situation are found in the following tweets:

@Jairbolsonaro is the most beloved ex in Brazil! All the persecution of the old Lula-backed press against him is not a mere coincidence.

Published by Congresswoman Carla Zambelli (PL-SP) on August 25, 2023
FAKE NEWS: Some media outlets do not tire of playing against the country and pursuing the Lula government. Articles on ‘Valor,’ ‘O Globo,’ ‘UOL,’ and others dealing with a supposed fall in Christmas sales are lies and show that everything is worth generating a crisis. This kind of news deceives the reader and generates a false sense that the economy is not going well!

Published by Congressman Carlos Zarattini (PT-SP) on December 28, 2023

Following this discursive pattern, the term “fake news” is used as an instrument to discredit journalism and its professionals. The idea that the press manufactures and disseminates lies premeditated to harm political actors—such as former President Jair Bolsonaro and the current national leader, Lula—remains the central discourse of the attacks. Therefore, one of the monitoring results is the understanding that political opponents tend to have similar positions in the face of criticism and supposedly unfavorable journalistic coverage. The main difference between these groups is in the frequency of attacks, since the Congress members on the left of the spectrum are a minority and are at the base of the list, with proportionally fewer aggressive tweets.

No attacks were identified among the tweets of the current head of the Republic, Lula (PT). The President disclosed 20 posts throughout the year using the research keywords. In 95% of them, the terms were neutral and/or informative, mainly dealing with his communication agenda, interviews, and the reproduction of information published by the press. In 5% of the cases, criticism of alleged decontextualized speech by the media emerged. Shortly, monitoring of social networks will be expanded, including other members of the Lula government, to verify if there are attacks on the speeches of figures close to the President.
3. About the Future

Data from the 2023 monitoring indicate that the scenario of press freedom in Brazil is undergoing gradual changes, with the total number of alerts falling by 40.7%. However, only the results of the coming years can confirm a trend of improvement in the work conditions of journalists and media in the country. Moreover, the decrease in absolute values does not mean that the situation is not challenging for press professionals. The proportion of severe attacks—involving physical violence, threats, persecution, intimidation, and destruction of equipment—grew from 31.2% in 2022 to 38.2% in 2023. This was mainly due to attacks by former President Jair Bolsonaro (PL) supporters on the buildings of the three branches of government in January.

Another category that faced a proportional increase was that of Civil and Criminal Proceedings, which rose from 2.1% to 7.9% in the year analyzed by this report. It is an indirect attack strategy that seeks to constrain journalistic work, often suffocating professionals with abusive demands and, in some cases, coordinated filings. The monitoring recorded episodes of both lawsuits and judicial convictions against journalists and communicators that revealed some facts of public interest. The frightening effect
of these actions affects not only those who are demanded, but also the number of journalists who work in the same coverage and the population who see their right to access the affected information.

The Internet remains a source of problems when it comes to protecting journalists and communicators since social media platforms are frequent arenas of attacks on these professionals—mainly by political actors and their followers: 52.1% of the cases in 2023 had origin or repercussions on the Internet, and 55.7% had state agents as perpetrators.

The monitoring of members of the National Congress on X/Twitter allows to list the Congresspeople who most use the Network to reach the press. In this group, names such as Magno Malta (PL-ES), Flavio Bolsonaro (PL-J), Filipe Barros (PL-PR), and Carla Zambelli (PL-SP) emerge. The involvement of politicians in attacks on newspapers, journalists, and journalism is worrying, as it feeds violent and anti-democratic episodes such as those that took place on January 8, 2023. Elected or unelected political agents must protect democratic pillars and principles, including the strong and free press.

In this context, Abraji recommends:

- **State agents** must not violate press freedom, either by preventing access to information or by adopting a speech against the work of journalists.
- **Government branches** must reinforce policies to protect journalists and communicators who are victims of attacks due to the exercise of the profession, considering the new forms of attack and observed trends.
- **Social media platforms** must develop parameters and tools to address online violence affecting
journalists, considering their position in the public debate and their role in revealing facts of public interest.

- **Newsrooms and journalistic companies** must adopt training, prevention and protection measures for their professionals considering the profession’s risks, whether they are hired or freelancers, reporters, or other workers involved in producing journalistic content.

- **Journalists, communicators, and other press professionals** must report aggressions suffered while working, seeking support within the newsrooms, with the public authorities and civil society organizations defending press freedom, and using their voices to combat the violence other colleagues may suffer.